Kyrgyzstan: Russian Base Plan Alarms Tashkent

   

Uzbekistan fears Moscow’s motives for offering to station troops close to its borders.

By Timur Toktonaliev in Bishkek (RCA No. 585, 30-Jul-09)

Russian plans to open a second military base in Kyrgyzstan are being seen as a challenge to neighbouring Uzbekistan, which regards itself as the dominant power in the region.

Tashkent is clearly unhappy about a scheme which would see a highly mobile force of foreign troops stationed close to its border in the unstable Fergana valley.

Moscow’s existing military facility at Kant in northern Kyrgyzstan is used for combat aircraft and is seen as a counterbalance to the United States airbase located only a few kilometers away.

The new one, if it came into being, would be located far to the south, near the Kyrgyz border with Uzbekistan.

Formally, the force deployed there would, like the Kant airbase, come under the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, CSTO, a post-Soviet security grouping that includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as Russia and Kyrgyzstan.

The CSTO already has a joint force for rapid deployment, but in February 2009, members agreed to a Russian proposal to create a more powerful military formation, the Collective Rapid-Reaction Force, consisting of 20,000 soldiers drawn from CSTO states with armoured units and artillery. It is this new force that would have a presence in southern Kyrgyzstan.

When the CSTO signed an agreement on the new force on June 14, Uzbekistan and Belarus refrained from doing so.

Rumours that southern Kyrgyzstan was under consideration as one location for the CSTO troops started circulating after a July 7 meeting between President Kurmanbek Bakiev and Russia’s deputy prime minister Igor Sechin and defence minister Anatoly Serdyukov. Neither government would confirm that the base was discussed at these talks, but on July 29 the Russian news agency RIA Novosti quoted Russian presidential aide Sergei Prikhodko as saying, "Everything has been agreed, in principle."

Speaking ahead of a CSTO meeting in the Kyrgyz resort town of Cholpon Ata scheduled for July 31, Prikhodko stressed, "In essence, this is not a Russian base. These are efforts in line with CSTO plans to set up a joint rapid-reaction force."

In interviews for the New York Times and Reuters news agency in mid-July, President Bakiev described the proposal in slightly different terms, as a Russian-Kyrgyz counter-terrorism centre that would be used for training purposes.

Analysts in Kyrgyzstan offer a variety of reasons why Moscow might want to take on a second military commitment in Kyrgyzstan.

One obvious explanation is continuing concern over continuing violence in Afghanistan, and the possible spill-over of Islamic insurgency into Central Asia. Such concerns will have been increased by recent violence in Tajikistan, which lies between Afghan territory and the Kyrgyz south; and before that in Uzbekistan. (On the Tajik unrest, see Taming Tajikistan’s Eastern Valleys, RCA No. 584, 23-Jul-09, and Chasing Phantoms in the Tajik Mountains, RCA No. 581, 24-Jun-09; and on the attacks in Uzbekistan in late May, Andijan Attackers’ Identity Still Unclear, News Briefing Central Asia, 27-May-09.)

The Kyrgyz perception that security needs to be bolstered on its southern periphery is understandable, given the recent history of this part of the country, from incursions by guerrillas from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in 1999-2000, to clashes between police and suspected militants this year (reported by IWPR in Upsurge in Militant Presence in Kyrgyzstan, RCA No. 582, 03-Jul-09).

Logically, this is an area where Bishkek and Tashkent should share a common interest. But the Uzbeks are wary of any external power taking up residence near their borders.

While the Uzbek government has not formally commented on the planned location of the base, an anonymous senior official told the RIA Novosti that “Tashkent categorically objects to new foreign military bases being established in neighbouring states”.

Meanwhile, an Uzbek foreign ministry press release issued four days after the June 14 meeting contained implicit criticism of the terms under which the rapid-reaction force had been conceived.

It stressed that the purpose of CSTO joint military action must only be to respond to threats emanating from outside member states, rather than to help deal with internal strife, and added that any decision to intervene must be by a consensus among members.

Mars Sariev, a political analyst in Kyrgyzstan, suspects that the talk of stationing troops near the Uzbek border is no more than a tactical ploy designed to make Tashkent more compliant with Russia’s wishes, specifically to force it to sign up to the Collective Rapid-Reaction Force.

“It’s creating an arena for talks with Uzbekistan – a new base as an instrument by which the CSTO can pressure Uzbekistan into accepting the rapid-reaction force. If that happens, it’s possible the base will then recede as an issue,” said Sariev, who regards the issue as a “diplomatic battle between Russian and Uzbekistan, with Kyrgyzstan merely used as the weapon of choice”.

Farhod Tolipov, a political analyst from Tashkent, sees the entire project as misconceived, especially if it is intended as a threat to Uzbekistan, which has never done anything so offensive to Moscow as to warrant this kind of tactic.

“As it tries to exert its influence, Russia is more liable to exacerbate problems by introducing a military dimension. Influence needs to be exerted by political methods, diplomacy and negotiations,” he said. “Uzbekistan has never displayed hostile intentions towards Russia or other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States or the CSTO. If it holds back in certain areas, especially when it comes to defence, that doesn’t mean it has turned its back on the [CSTO] organisation or on Russia itself.”

For the moment, the future of the CSTO base in the south appears to have little bearing on relations between Kyrgyzstan and another great power, the United States.

Visiting Bishkek, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns told a July 12 press conference that this was entirely a matter for Kyrgyzstan.

“Any step that strengthens the sovereignty, independence and security of Kyrgyzstan is a sensible one,” he said.

The issue of a second Russian base might have had more resonance earlier in the year, when it seemed the Kyrgyz authorities were about to evict the Americans from their air base outside Bishkek, However, in early July a new agreement was signed under which the base is re-designated as a freight transit hub but basically stays in place. (See US Base in Kyrgyzstan Renamed but Remains, RCA No. 581, 26-Jun-09.)

Timur Toktonaliev is an IWPR-trained journalist in Kyrgyzstan.